Shamim Mafi, who left Iran in 2013 and obtained U.S. permanent residency in 2016, was arrested at Los Angeles International Airport on April 19, 2026. Living in Woodland Hills, California, she presented herself as a successful international businesswoman. Federal prosecutors say she instead ran a front company that brokered multimillion‑dollar arms deals for Iran to conflict zones, including Sudan. She is charged with conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and is presumed innocent unless proven guilty in court.
According to the indictment, Mafi operated Oman‑registered Atlas International Business LLC (also known in filings as Atlas Global Holding and Atlas Tech LLC) and used it to procure and arrange shipments of weapons and military equipment on Iran’s behalf. Prosecutors say that in 2024 she helped arrange a contract worth more than $72.5 million for Iranian‑made Mohajer‑6 armed drones to Sudan’s Ministry of Defense and was paid in excess of $7 million for her role. They allege she also coordinated travel and meetings to finalize transactions in Iran.
Court documents depict an extensive procurement pipeline. Prosecutors allege Mafi organized purchases or transfers of hundreds of non‑guided aerial bombs and hundreds of thousands of munitions and small arms components — a list that, according to filings, included 500 bombs, 55,000 bomb fuses, roughly 70,000 AK‑47 rifles, 250 million rounds of AK‑47 ammunition, 1,000 rocket‑propelled grenade launchers and 500,000 rockets, among other items. The government says payments were structured to avoid detection: funds were moved through informal money‑exchange networks across the Middle East and Africa, routed via banks in Dubai, and in some cases delivered as physical cash in crates of $100 bills. Prosecutors cited a 2024 WhatsApp exchange and photos of a crate being opened as part of the evidentiary record.
Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche said investigators arrested Mafi because she posed a flight risk; she had purchased a plane ticket to Turkey. A former member of the FBI’s Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task Force, speaking on background, described the arrest as consistent with a long‑running pattern of Iranian procurement and intelligence activity in Southern California and other U.S. cities with large Iranian diasporas. “This is likely part of a much larger network spread throughout the United States,” the former official said.
Analysts observing the case noted that routing transactions through Oman and other Gulf states aligns with Iran’s known sanctions‑evasion techniques. Hans‑Jakob Schindler of the Counter Extremism Project characterized Tehran’s procurement approach as coordinated across intelligence, military, economic and diplomatic organs — a system that relies heavily on obfuscation and third‑party intermediaries. International strategist John Thomas called the facts “textbook” sanctions evasion, pointing out the frequent use of Gulf and regional intermediaries as cutouts.
Prosecutors also allege direct links between Mafi and Iran’s intelligence services. Court filings say she had more than 60 two‑way contacts with an Iranian intelligence officer between December 2022 and June 2025. The filings claim Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) provided money and encouraged Mafi to open a U.S. business, framed as a way to reclaim properties the government alleges were seized from her father in 2020. The complaint asserts she submitted a letter of intent to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) regarding a bomb‑fuse transaction and did not obtain required U.S. Treasury licenses or register under State Department defense trade rules.
Mafi has told investigators that MOIS did not task her to carry out activities inside the United States and that she was “more useful to them in Iran than in the United States,” statements prosecutors dispute. Schindler said the volume of phone contact with an intelligence officer is notable given the operational risks, suggesting either lapses in tradecraft or a different handling method. Thomas said the pattern reflects how the Iranian state can embed operatives overseas and use lawful residency as cover for illicit logistics and procurement.
For investigators, the case highlights familiar procurement methods: identifying suppliers of dual‑use items, using commercial intermediaries, and trans‑shipping goods through third‑country firms and networks. The former FBI official noted that both MOIS and IRGC elements have long acquired restricted items by routing them through diaspora and regional commercial channels, a trend monitored across Southern California and elsewhere.
The intended recipient, Sudan, has been embroiled in civil war since April 2023, producing a severe humanitarian crisis and mass displacement. Since Iranian cargo aircraft began landing near Port Sudan, Mohajer‑6 drones have been used by Sudanese forces in combat operations, leading to allegations that Iran repeatedly breached U.N. sanctions. Analysts say Iran’s interest in Sudan includes strategic aims: influence over actors controlling Red Sea access bolsters Tehran’s regional posture and complements relationships with other proxies, such as the Houthis across the Red Sea.
Observers stressed that a single prosecution will not dismantle an entrenched, transnational procurement infrastructure. Still, they argued such cases are valuable: they expose methods of concealment, yield investigative leads, and raise the operational cost for adversary networks, forcing reorganization and disruption. Prosecutors said the Mafi indictment demonstrates how intelligence and procurement mechanisms can hide behind commercial covers and diaspora networks, exploiting global financial and trade systems to sustain client forces and project influence.
Mafi appeared in federal court on April 20 and did not enter a plea. She was remanded to custody pending a detention hearing. Investigators arrested her as she sought to leave the country, and government lawyers say affidavits, search warrants and seized communications form the core of their case.
Law‑enforcement and intelligence officials said the arrest offers a window into a broader, long‑standing effort to move materiel, technology and funds to actors aligned with Tehran. The former FBI task force member urged coordinated, sustained action across investigative and intelligence agencies — and other instruments of statecraft if necessary — to disrupt procurement pipelines that enable hostile actors to acquire weapons and expand influence abroad.