On September 22, 2025, Ahmed al-Sharaa—once hunted by the United States and its allies as a leader of the Nusra Front—appeared at the Concordia Summit in New York and was later received at the White House. Retired Gen. David Petraeus, who once led operations against Nusra, interviewed him onstage; weeks later, President Donald Trump announced a 180-day suspension of Syria sanctions and publicly praised al-Sharaa as a stabilizing force. What was unthinkable a few years ago has become official U.S. policy: the rebranding and international acceptance of a man who rose through a jihadist organization now aligned with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
That pivot is a dangerous gamble. Al-Sharaa’s ascent did not come through democratic reform or broad national conciliation. He built influence in the chaos of war through a group that the United Nations, Human Rights Watch and multiple security analysts have tied to suicide bombings, massacres, torture and other grave abuses during Syria’s civil conflict. HTS’s public rebranding has not erased the ideology or methods that enabled its dominance. Washington’s decision to lift sanctions and remove terrorist designations in favor of handshakes and photo ops sends a clarion message: past crimes and violent governance can be overlooked if rebranded as order.
The consequences are immediate and troubling for Syria’s plural society. Kurds, Druze, Alawites and many Arab communities view an unelected former jihadist consolidating power in Damascus, with Western endorsement, as a threat to the decentralized, rights-based settlement many Syrians want. These groups endured mass violence under Baathist centralization and under extremist rule; they fear a return to homogenizing politics that erase cultural, linguistic and political pluralism. Reports from scholars and regional outlets document moves consistent with that fear: Kurdish curricula and cultural programs curtailed, public recognition of Kurdish holidays reduced, and interim constitutional measures rejecting federalism. These are not mere symbols. They signal a governing philosophy that privileges a single national narrative over plural citizenship.
Tensions are already rising. In Suwayda and other Druze areas, recent clashes and the central government’s apparent support for favored Sunni tribal actors have deepened insecurity and undermined local defense structures. For communities that relied on local forces to defend against ISIS and to maintain relative security, the centralization push is interpreted as both punitive and existential. Kurdish forces that held territory and defeated ISIS were decisive partners in the fight against the caliphate; sidelining them risks undercutting the very actors who preserved parts of Syria from total collapse.
Centralization under al-Sharaa is framed by his government as a defense of national unity and sovereignty. In practice, it resembles the same concentrated power structures that contributed to Syria’s slide into civil war: monopoly control in Damascus, the marginalization of peripheries, and governance by coercion rather than consent. History and political science suggest that stability in deeply divided societies more often stems from balanced power-sharing than from reinforced central authority. When the periphery has credible means to check the center—constitutional autonomy, local security forces, shared institutions—strategic incentives shift from force to negotiation. Conversely, when the center is unchecked, the likelihood of revolt, insurgency or renewed fragmentation increases.
For meaningful stability, Syria needs decentralization that guarantees cultural, linguistic and administrative autonomy for its diverse peoples. A federal or highly devolved system could accommodate Kurdish, Druze and other communities with distinct arrangements for governance and security. Practical models could include local police and militia structures integrated into shared security frameworks, or recognized regional administrations with fiscal and legislative powers. Community-based security forces such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Druze local units should be part of security architectures as equal partners, not subordinate appendages of a central army that has historically used force to suppress dissent.
Regional dynamics complicate the picture. Turkey views any durable Kurdish autonomy near its border as a strategic threat and may support al-Sharaa’s centralizing tendencies if they align with Ankara’s goal of neutralizing Kurdish self-rule. Washington’s move, therefore, has the unintended effect of aligning U.S. policy more closely with Turkish objectives at the expense of Kurdish partners who fought ISIS and cooperated with international counterterrorism efforts. That alignment will strain U.S. credibility with local allies and could incentivize Ankara to press for arrangements that further undermine plural governance in northern Syria.
Two policy errors stand out. First, rewarding a former jihadist with international legitimacy without enforceable conditions and accountability for past abuses undermines international norms and the demands of victims. Second, supporting centralization over inclusive power-sharing ignores the lived lessons of Syria’s recent history: a homogenizing, top-down order breeds exclusion and violent backlash. The result could be a revamped authoritarian system—different in style, perhaps, but similar in its repression and ideological rigor—where homogeneity is enforced and dissent criminalized.
If the international community is serious about Syrian stability and rights, it should insist on clear, verifiable commitments before recognizing or empowering any post-conflict government. Those commitments must include independent, inclusive constitution-making; guarantees for minority rights; recognition of cultural and linguistic freedoms; mechanisms for local governance; transparent, internationally monitored security-sector reform; and credible pathways to elections overseen by impartial observers. Al-Sharaa is unelected and owes his authority to military power and foreign endorsements. No leader with that profile should be permitted to reshape Syria’s political order without robust constitutional checks and inclusive participation from the country’s diverse communities.
Washington’s current approach risks building stability on the shaky foundation of enforced unity and one-size-fits-all identity politics. Syria’s path to durable peace runs through the periphery: devolved authorities, negotiated power-sharing, and embedded protections for minorities and local governance. Strengthening the center at the expense of pluralism invites the same cycles of repression and insurgency that have devastated Syria. The alternative—an inclusive federal or devolved system that institutionalizes checks and balances—offers the best hope of preventing a new era of authoritarian rule cloaked in religious or national homogeneity.
Ultimately, the judgment about al-Sharaa will be made by Syrians living under his rule. Washington and its allies can either use leverage to insist on constitutional guarantees, independent oversight and real decentralization, or they can hand over legitimacy to a leader whose past and policies point toward a narrower, more repressive future. The choice will shape Syria’s political trajectory for a generation.
