Myanmar held nationwide elections on January 25, 2026 — the first since the February 2021 military coup — amid active conflict, displacement and a boycott by the National Unity Government (NUG) and allied armed groups. Voting took place in 265 of 330 townships, largely in areas accessible to authorities. The NUG, formed by ousted politicians and activists and backed by People’s Defence Forces and allied ethnic militias, rejected the vote’s legitimacy and continued armed operations to prevent the consolidation of military rule.
Despite widespread insecurity, reported turnout in participating constituencies was roughly 55%. The junta presented the elections as a step toward restoring order, but critics and many international observers questioned the vote’s inclusiveness and credibility. ASEAN declined to endorse or send an observer mission, saying conditions for a credible election were absent. China publicly welcomed the process as a domestic matter and stressed stability; several Southeast Asian states took pragmatic positions and sent observers. India likewise adopted a cautious, stability-first posture, having earlier expressed support for holding elections in a “fair and inclusive” manner and deploying monitoring teams.
The military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won a decisive majority of contested seats, taking control of both chambers of parliament. Combined with the constitutionally guaranteed 25% of seats for military appointees, the result gives the junta effective legislative control and formalizes the military’s grip on state institutions. In practice, the ballot reinforced existing power structures rather than opening space for meaningful parliamentary opposition.
For New Delhi, developments in Naypyidaw have immediate and tangible implications. India shares a 1,643-kilometer border with Myanmar along the northeastern states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram. Since 2021, conflict in Myanmar has exacerbated instability in border regions and driven cross-border criminality: weapons and drug trafficking, militia infiltration and insurgent training camps. Indian authorities reported seizures of explosives, arms and narcotics in Mizoram’s Champhai, Saiha and Lawngtlai districts, with the value of drugs seized between September 2025 and January 2026 exceeding $15.5 million. Manipur recorded numerous drug and arms trafficking cases in 2025. These trends have sharpened concerns about security, governance and law and order in India’s northeast.
The conflict in Myanmar has also produced sustained refugee flows. Mid-2025 clashes between Chin National Front (CNF) and the Chin Defence Force (CDF) pushed thousands across into India’s Mizoram; by March 2026 some 28,355 Myanmar nationals were officially registered there (27,574 biometric registrations completed). India’s total registered Myanmar asylum seekers exceed 86,000. While ethnic kinship between Mizoram’s Mizo and Myanmar’s Chin populations has eased some social pressures, the sudden influx intensified competition for scarce jobs, contributed to rising crime, and strained local services. In mid-2025, Mizoram officials linked a significant share of local criminal cases to people who had entered India illegally or as refugees. In Manipur, tensions that erupted into violent conflict in 2023 were aggravated by refugee arrivals and alleged links to illicit poppy cultivation; these dynamics prompted New Delhi to end the Free Movement Regime and begin erecting border fencing in 2024.
The instability poses direct risks to India’s geoeconomic ambitions under its Act East policy. The India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway — a flagship connectivity project intended to integrate India’s northeast with Southeast Asia — runs through contested border regions. New Delhi has invested over $250 million directly in this corridor and extended more than $1 billion in credit lines for broader ASEAN connectivity. Analysts estimate that extending corridors to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam could generate up to $70 billion in additional regional GDP and create some 20 million jobs by mid-decade. Continued insecurity in Myanmar, however, has delayed construction, increased costs and raised doubts about the long-term viability of these projects.
The electoral process itself was uneven, especially in ethnically restive and insurgent-controlled border states. The junta negotiated local ceasefires or tacit noninterference with some ethnic armed organizations to allow limited polling in certain frontier areas, with mixed success. Chin State remained largely excluded because resistance groups retained territorial control and rejected the vote. Sagaing and Kachin saw significant disruption: multiple townships were excluded from voting due to security concerns, and armed attacks targeted election logistics and personnel. Organizations monitoring the process documented numerous conflict incidents even in areas declared “active” or “stable” for voting, underlining insurgent efforts to intimidate officials and voters.
The outcome therefore leaves Myanmar politically and militarily polarized. While the junta now claims institutional legitimacy, the conflict is unlikely to end in the short term: the NUG and affiliated insurgents continue resisting and are invested in preventing a return to untrammeled military authority. The election did not produce a comprehensive or credible pathway to reconciliation; instead, it formalized a contest for control that remains contested on the ground.
India’s response has been pragmatic and calibrated. New Delhi engages with Naypyidaw to preserve border security, maintain humanitarian access, and keep channels open for possible political de‑escalation, while avoiding an outright endorsement of military rule. This pragmatic stance contrasts with the refusal of some ASEAN members to engage the junta, a posture that, critics argue, has allowed opposition forces to double down on armed resistance rather than enter dialogue. The article’s argument is that blanket isolation risks prolonging conflict, deepening humanitarian crises, and imperiling regional economic integration.
For India, the policy challenge is to balance competing priorities: safeguarding domestic security in border states, alleviating humanitarian suffering, and protecting long‑term geoeconomic projects without conferring legitimacy on military rule. That requires a nuanced approach that combines security cooperation, targeted humanitarian assistance, discreet diplomatic engagement, and support for inclusive mediation led by credible regional actors. Facilitating genuine political dialogue that includes stakeholder groups across Myanmar’s spectrum — including ethnic communities and civilian representatives — is the only plausible route to durable peace and to unlocking the economic potential of connectivity initiatives.
The election thus underlines a difficult reality: military control has been reinforced institutionally, but stability remains fragile. Isolationist policies risk entrenching conflict and undermining regional projects that could benefit Myanmar and its neighbors. Pragmatic engagement, carefully calibrated to preserve humanitarian and security interests while promoting inclusive political solutions, remains the most realistic way to reduce violence, manage refugee flows and revive stalled connectivity under India’s Act East ambitions.
