When tanks and missiles dominate headlines, small diplomatic acts — a phone call, a quiet memorandum, a principled public comment — can do much of the heavy lifting. Indonesia’s recent outreach to Qatar illustrates how discreet, patient diplomacy can sustain fragile channels for dialogue when more dramatic tools fail.
President Prabowo Subianto’s visit to Doha and his meeting with Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani were more than ceremonial. Jakarta and Doha agreed to launch a Strategic Dialogue and signed memorandums signaling new economic and political ties. Reports of a roughly $2 billion Gulf commitment to Indonesian infrastructure underline that Jakarta’s approach is to buy influence through partnership and patient convening, not coercion. The political subtext is clear: investment in neutral spaces and relationships preserves the ability to mediate and keep talks open.
Qatar has long been one of the few states able to engage simultaneously with Hamas, Israeli interlocutors and Western and regional capitals. An Israeli strike on Qatari soil in early September shattered some of that sanctuary, prompting Doha to pause parts of its mediation work. The result has been predictable and worrying: fewer back-channels, more diplomatic paralysis, and a greater risk that conflicts harden into long-running violence. In that void, great-power rivalry deepens and civilians suffer.
Indonesia brings a distinct comparative advantage. Its “free and active” (bebas-aktif) diplomacy and ASEAN’s quiet, consensus-driven methods combine Muslim-majority legitimacy with low-profile convening skills. The ASEAN Way — emphasis on noninterference, private consultation and endurance over spectacle — is often slow and maddening, but it can keep dialogue alive where loud public condemnation drives parties further apart. Jakarta can translate this endurance into practical measures: hosting second-track talks, co-sponsoring humanitarian corridors, and facilitating technical discussions on prisoner exchanges, ceasefire mechanics and other discrete issues that make ceasefires stick.
If Indonesia seeks to meaningfully augment Doha’s reduced role, it must act strategically. First, protect negotiation sanctuaries. International law treats diplomatic sanctuaries as sacrosanct, but practice often does not. Indonesia should champion an ASEAN–Gulf compact: a modest, practical multilateral agreement with protocols to protect host venues, mediators and humanitarian couriers. Measures might include rapid fact-finding teams, agreed “no-strike” notification channels for high-risk meetings, and joint diplomatic démarches that raise the immediate political cost of violations. A pledge won’t stop bullets, but collective, swift political responses deter attacks and preserve space for talks.
Second, institutionalize two-track diplomacy with teeth. Indonesia and Qatar are a credible pairing: Doha maintains access to armed nonstate actors; Jakarta provides multilateral legitimacy and regional convening muscle. Together they could underwrite an “Inclusive Track” secretariat — small, agile, neutral, and designed to keep negotiators talking even when capitals exchange public recriminations. Funded initially by Gulf and ASEAN donors and hosted in a neutral location, such a body would stabilize back-channels that prevent escalation. Middle powers — Australia, EU members and others — should seed and support it as a practical alternative to the zero-sum politics now paralysing global forums like the UN Security Council.
Third, convert moral solidarity into durable humanitarian mechanisms. Indonesia has used its UN platform to cosponsor ceasefire language and to press for aid access; next it should push for protected humanitarian corridors under multilateral supervision backed by rapid-response financing. When mediators lose leverage, civilians die — and humanitarian shortfalls must not be the bill for failed diplomacy. A clear rule is useful: if a mediator secures a humanitarian route, a pooled fund activates within 72 hours to keep aid flowing. That turns rhetorical support into operational relief.
This agenda will be politically uncomfortable. ASEAN’s preference for quiet diplomacy will chafe against louder calls for immediate accountability. Some Gulf partners may resist anything perceived as external interference. Yet inaction carries greater costs: shrinking the space for mediation invites unilateral military responses, fuels proxy escalations and tilts regional balances toward securitized blocs.
Indonesia cannot replicate Qatar’s unique access on its own. But it can be the coal that keeps the embers alive: offering platforms, underwriting small technical talks, convening like-minded states and translating solidarity into concrete safeguards for diplomacy. That is practical middle-powercraft — not the dramatic thrust of military power but the patient, persistent work of keeping channels open until politics catches up with humanitarian needs.
In a world where great powers posture and headlines reward force, middle powers must deliver the quieter instruments that prevent wars from becoming permanent. Indonesia and Qatar, supported by an international community willing to fund and protect neutral spaces, can help ensure that the last hospitable venues for negotiation do not close.
