Israel and the United States launched an intensified campaign against Iranian targets beginning February 28, 2026 — the second time both have struck Iran directly, but with far greater intensity. The scale of these attacks, and Tehran’s inability to blunt them, are the outcome of decades of strategic choices: an ideologically driven foreign policy that exported revolution, expansive investment in nuclear and missile programs, and the growing domestic power of security institutions that insulated the regime from internal accountability.
The Islamic Republic was consolidated after 1979 when Ayatollah Khomeini marginalized other revolutionary forces and forged a theocratic state. From the start, the new leadership embraced anti‑American and anti‑Israeli positions and cultivated a network of allied militias and political movements across the region. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps increasingly captured key economic and political levers inside Iran, extending its reach into finance, construction and governance while the state responded to dissent with harsh repression, including torture and executions.
These dynamics produced several long‑term strategic miscalculations. Seeking to export the revolution, Tehran built and financed an “Axis of Resistance” composed of nonstate actors — Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shi’a militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. This posture earned Iran influence but also international isolation. Between 2012 and 2018, Iran reportedly spent more than $16 billion supporting allies in Syria, Iraq and Yemen; those expenditures, combined with sanctions, eroded ordinary Iranians’ living standards and stoked domestic resentment.
Tehran’s priority for decades has been nuclear enrichment and ballistic missiles. Those programs consumed financial and technical resources while other defense needs — modern fighters, robust air defenses, civil defense infrastructure, sirens and shelters for civilians — were neglected. Iran’s nuclear progress was repeatedly set back by external actions: cyber‑attacks, targeted assassinations of scientists, and bombing during the 2025 12‑day conflict. Its ballistic missiles, though numerous, proved vulnerable to coordinated air and counter‑strike campaigns by Israel and the US.
Ideology further narrowed Tehran’s room for maneuver. The regime’s intransigence on negotiations, especially declaring the missile program “nonnegotiable,” reflected confidence that regional proxy networks and asymmetric tactics would deter major powers. That confidence was misplaced. The October 7 Hamas attacks and the subsequent Israel‑Gaza war dramatically reshaped regional dynamics. Iran’s principal proxy, Hezbollah, suffered severe losses in a concentrated offensive: key commanders, supply lines and storage depots were hit, degrading its deterrent capacity. Simultaneously, the long rule of Syria’s Bashar al‑Assad collapsed unexpectedly in a swift campaign that ended his regime’s control and removed one of Iran’s most reliable state partners. The fall of Assad and the weakening of Hezbollah removed the strategic depth Tehran had relied on to project power.
At home, the regime faced mounting unrest. Waves of protests culminated in mass demonstrations that began in late December 2025. Official and independent tallies of casualties diverge sharply — Tehran cited figures as high as 30,000 killed, while human rights groups have verified thousands of deaths — but the scale of repression and loss of life underscores the depth of domestic opposition. Public scenes of celebration at the reported death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, including dancing and anti‑regime chants, illustrated the fragility of elite legitimacy and the erosion of coercive social consent.
The current war has exposed additional operational weaknesses. Iran has struggled to defend its airspace against American and Israeli aircraft. Civil defense measures are inadequate: many cities lack effective early‑warning systems, shelters or evacuation protocols. These shortcomings have a direct human cost and also sap morale and confidence in state competence.
Viewed as a strategic sequence, Tehran made a series of costly choices: prioritizing external projection over internal resilience; channeling resources to proxies and contested programs rather than to civilian protection or diversified defense capabilities; and holding to a binary ideological posture that limited diplomatic flexibility. Each choice compounded the others. The loss of regional patrons and proxies, the degradation of nuclear infrastructure, and the visible inability to protect citizens have left the regime isolated internationally and weakened domestically.
Even if Iran survives the immediate military campaign, the damage is profound. Regionally, Tehran’s ability to shape outcomes and deter adversaries is diminished. Its network of allies remains, but many partners are degraded and less able to act as force multipliers. Domestically, the regime has been politically battered — beaten in the streets by an energized protest movement and militarily by superior airpower — and faces a legitimacy crisis that repression alone may not resolve.
In short, decades of ideological rigidity, overreach abroad and misallocated military priorities have produced an exposed, brittle state. The regime’s survival is no longer assured by fear or strategic depth alone; even if it endures, it will likely administer a diminished Iran: weaker regionally, more isolated internationally, and contested internally. The real test for Tehran now is whether it can adjust strategies to shore up domestic resilience, rebuild diplomatic space, and soberly reassess military priorities — or whether its accumulated mistakes will continue to erode the foundations of rule.
[Patrick Bodovitz edited this piece]
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
