The Southern Transitional Council (STC) and its affiliated security formations are the most effective indigenous partner in southern Yemen against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State — Yemen Province (ISY). Despite limited resources and uneven international backing, STC-aligned forces remain on the front lines, sustaining counterterrorism operations in one of the world’s most complex security environments.
Persistent threats and the STC’s front-line role
On October 21, 2025, a coordinated attack involving car bombs and suicide bombers struck a government compound and STC-affiliated units in Abyan Governorate, underlining the enduring threat posed by jihadist groups in the south. Fighters linked to the STC were reportedly among the casualties. In June 2024, a vehicle carrying a southern security commander was ambushed by AQAP in Al-Hamima, Abyan, killing one STC-aligned soldier and wounding two others. AQAP remains active across the south and frequently targets STC forces and other security actors. Recent assaults in Abyan have been attributed by local sources to AQAP militants, highlighting the south’s vulnerability.
The South’s fractured political landscape — and an institutionally weak central state — has produced security vacuums that extremist movements exploit. Analysts note the STC is a “shared enemy” of both AQAP and the Iran-aligned Houthi movement because of the STC’s aggressive counterterror operations.
Operational advantage and indigenous legitimacy
The STC’s paramilitary arm, the Security Belt Forces (SBF), founded around 2016, has received training and degrees of support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The SBF operates under the STC across southern Yemen and provides the operational capacity, local knowledge and community access that outside actors lack.
In April 2022 the STC formally joined Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), the internationally recognized governing body, giving it a dual identity as both a local military actor and a partial political stakeholder. Through this position the STC controls substantial territory in the south, maintaining local legitimacy and trusted access in regions where extremist networks thrive amid weak governance.
Given its foothold, the STC is arguably the only local force capable of sustained counterterror campaigns in southern Yemen — especially while central government institutions remain fragile.
Strategic maritime and regional implications
Southern Yemen sits at the heart of global maritime security. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden are critical chokepoints for international trade and energy shipments. A deterioration of security in these waters risks severe global repercussions for shipping, insurance costs and energy supply chains.
Through governance and policing functions, the STC has potential to stabilize these maritime corridors. Western engagement with the STC should therefore be seen not only as a matter of Yemeni politics but as a component of international maritime security and energy protection.
Why Western governments should engage strategically
Western policymakers must move beyond treating the STC solely as a separatist movement. In practice the STC functions as a credible counterterrorism partner with significant local legitimacy in the south. A calibrated engagement strategy could include:
– Intelligence sharing with STC-aligned forces operating in AQAP-dense areas.
– Specialized training, logistical support and equipment to enhance operational capacity.
– Direct liaison mechanisms that bypass dysfunctional national-level bottlenecks.
– Investment in local governance and recruitment-prevention initiatives so civilian stability complements military efforts.
Engagement must be accompanied by accountability. Support should align with international norms on human rights and the use of force. Amnesty International and other monitors have raised concerns about restrictions on civic space and bureaucratic barriers in STC-administered areas, underscoring the need for transparency and oversight.
Western engagement should also be embedded within broader diplomatic efforts, including the UN-led peace process. Many analysts argue that a viable long-term solution to Yemen’s conflict may require recognizing southern self-determination alongside a stable northern entity — effectively a two-entity outcome. STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi has publicly called for such a framework, arguing that military means alone cannot resolve Yemen’s protracted conflict.
Consequences of inaction
If Western governments fail to engage meaningfully with the STC, the consequences could be severe:
– AQAP and ISY may exploit instability in the south to regroup and launch new regional or international attacks.
– Houthi–extremist coordination could deepen, forming a transnational threat nexus across the Gulf, Horn of Africa and Red Sea maritime corridor. Recent incidents blamed on both Houthis and AQAP illustrate the growing risk of convergence.
– Maritime chokepoints could remain vulnerable to interdiction, threatening global shipping and energy security.
– STC forces, already overstretched and underfunded, could face burnout or morale collapse, reversing years of counterterrorism gains.
Strategic choice
Western governments face a decisive choice: engage and empower the STC as a credible security partner — integrating counterterrorism, maritime security and governance — or risk allowing extremist groups to re-entrench themselves in southern Yemen. The latter would have consequences beyond Yemen, threatening regional stability and global trade.
The Southern Transitional Council stands as the most capable indigenous force countering extremism in the south. Extremist groups like AQAP and ISY view the STC as a direct threat to their operations and continuously target its personnel. For Western powers, the convergence of counterterrorism priorities, maritime stability and regional security makes pragmatic, principled engagement with the STC both necessary and strategic — provided such support is coupled with oversight, human-rights safeguards and diplomatic integration into broader peace efforts.
[Kaitlyn Diana edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
